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Book Reviews
Sentencing in a Rational Society. By Nigel Walker. Basic Books:
1971. Pp. 239. $6.95.
Nigel Walker, University Reader in Criminology and Professorial
Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, is the author of two prior books1
dealing with crime in England. In Sentencing in a Rational Society,
he relies largely on British data, but he also deals with American,
Scandinavian and other Continental and scattered experiences. The first
words of the preface - "[t]his book is written for a particular sort
of society: one which is peaceful, affluent and ignorant, but aspires to
rationality" - raise at the outset, for anyone dealing with sentencing
in the United States, the need to read this book in the context of our
own current problems and attitudes. It may be that the great increase,
in frequency and degree, in expressions of man's inhumanity to man,
which we are witnessing in the United States, will soon lessen and
prove to be a thing of the moment. It may be that some of us view
our present society too critically. But a month spent last summer in
London's relative calm, walking without fear at night, eloquently
presented to this reviewer a striking contrast to an American big
city's agony and turmoil which require, for example, judges of the
United States District Court sitting in Baltimore to avoid having jurors
and court staff walk alone to nearby parking lots after dusk.
Mr. Walker defines peaceful as being "[p]eaceful enough . ..to
keep order without the help of troops" ;2 affluent as having the ability
to devote needed money and manpower to handling offenders; ignorant
as placing reliance on superstition rather than science; and rationality
as having the desire to have reason replace superstition and to develop
a systematic approach attuned to achieving the ultimate in rationality.
We in the United States are sufficiently affluent and probably sufficiently
peaceful, and most of us sincerely want the most rationally administered
penal system and say so. Whether we will put our money where our
mouths speak and hearts yearn is not as clear. Mr. Walker's acute
analyses of sentencing aims and limitations paint few absolutes and
implicitly caution against complete acceptance or rejection of the
validity of any sentencing principle. While we in the United States
must of necessity consider Mr. Walker's thinking in the light of our
immediate problems, the emotions provoked by those problems render
it all the more advisable that we examine what we are doing, thinking
N.
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and planning about sentencing with as few preconceived absolutes
as possible.
Noting the general reluctance of lawyers and penologists to explore
or to attach relevance to philosophical concepts, commenting that "if
the criminal law as a whole is the Cinderella of jurisprudence, then
the law of sentencing is Cinderella's illegitimate baby, ' 3 and isolating
moral and religious considerations from the sphere of secular penology,
the author lists four basic sentencing aims which have been advanced
by various writers: (1) "to protect offenders and suspected offenders
against unofficial retaliation"; (2) "to reduce the frequency of the
types of behaviour prohibited by the criminal law," which the author
labels "reductivism"; (3) "to cause the minimum of suffering" ("humanitarianism") ; and (4) "to ensure that offenders atone by suffering
for their offenses" ("retributivism")." Mr. Walker rejects the place
of retribution within the penal system and closes his philosophically
oriented introductory chapter as follows:
Let me summarize what I have been arguing. The reduction
of prohibited conduct must be the main aim of any penal system,
but must be tempered by both economic considerations and humanity if the system is to be practicable and tolerable....
A penal system designed by an economic reductivist, observing limits dictated not by retributive justice but by humanity,
would differ in some important respects from our present one.
It would be less ambiguous and illogical. It would distinguish less
sharply between actual and likely harm, and between intention
and inadvertence. It would lay far less emphasis on consistency in
sentencing. On the other hand, it would not be either intolerably
severe or unrealistically lenient. In short, it is not unthinkable.
The rest of this book is an attempt to show roughly what it
would be like.5
Consistent with the author's reductivist philosophy, the book's
treatment of sentencing itself is prefaced by a broad discussion of
what a rational society should characterize as criminal behavior and
how it can reduce the incidence thereof. The realization that our
criminal law has grown like Topsy is brought into focus by the
question: What sort of behavior should be classified as criminal?
Some crimes have been so denoted as a result of religious pressures;
others on the strength of popular feelings of the moment. Mr. Walker
notes that many have suggested excluding from the scope of criminal
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 3-5 (italicized in the original).
5. Id. at 21-22.
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law behavior which is merely offensive, but not actually harmful to
others. He notes that some have advocated excluding offenses the
punishment for which causes more harm than does the prohibited
conduct itself, and refraining from the use of the criminal law (a) to
compel people to act in their own best interests or (b) to espouse
prohibitions which do not have strong public support. Without detracting from the pragmatic need to establish such negative, conceptual
limitations, Mr. Walker suggests the more compelling need to "formulate positive principles to tell us what tasks the criminal law should
attempt"6 to state positive justifications independent of moral
considerations, for making given conduct a crime. The standard upon
which such principles and justifications should be based is, the author
indicates, the maintenance of "the smooth functioning of society and
the preservation of order."' Under it, "private homosexual, incestuous
or sodomitic acts between consenting adults"; "abortions performed
with the consent of the woman by a suitably qualified medical practitioner"; and "bigamy committed without any intention of defrauding,
deceiving or seducing a man or woman"' would not be classified as
criminal behavior.
The author breaks down, under the heading of "Techniques of
Crime-reduction," those techniques which are classified as "focused,"
"partially focused" or "unfocused." '9 "Thus for example the sentences
which courts impose on convicted thieves are focused, whereas propaganda intended to encourage people to take precautions against thieves
is 'unfocused.' "' Under the latter heading are included general deterrents, that is, "measures intended to discourage potential offenders
by their unpleasantness."" "[T]he very existence of a law prohibiting
this or that type of conduct is to some extent an unfocused form of
prevention, since it declares to the public at large that the conduct
in question is not tolerated by the society to which they belong."' 2
Admitting that such evidence as is available indicates a certain lack
of effectiveness of educational efforts in bringing about crime reduction,
Mr. Walker stresses that there has been little effort made in the
schools "to explore systematically the possibilities of ethical training"' 3
within the educational system aimed at establishing or altering attitudes.
As to the use of mass media, he concludes that the "onus of proof
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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still lies on those" contending that "mass media which report or depict
violence and other undesirable behaviour do not contribute to increases
in its frequency."' 4 Among "partially focused techniques" are those
aimed at identifiable areas or groups. Slum clearance as such, he
asserts, has not produced the noticeable reduction in crime which some
had predicted. Thus, while a recent Glasgow study established the
expected differences between conviction rates of "boys from 'good
working-class districts' and [of those] from slums [it] hardly [shows]
any difference between those still in the slums and those rehoused
from slums."' 15

Techniques focused on individuals include those which are preventive, such as special attention for a juvenile who has been in, or
apparently is about to get into, trouble; corrective, such as the elimination or reduction of a person's motives for committing crime; deterrent, such as measures employed because of their unpleasantness;
and incapacitative, such as making it impossible for the offender to
re-offend (in former days, by branding, amputation of a limb, transportation to a penal colony or corporal punishment; today, usually
by confinement).
Another technique involves measures directed toward reduction
of opportunity for crime, such as stringent precautions taken by merchants against shop-breaking or, as in West Germany, a law pursuant
to which automobile operators who leave their cars parked unlocked
are subject to prosecution.
An entire chapter is devoted to the topic of general deterrence.
From the outset the author identifies as a key issue the problem of
measuring the effectiveness of any particular technique as a successful
deterrent. "Deterrence has become a dirty word in penological discussion," he notes, "partly because it has so often been the battle
cry of those who support capital or corporal punishment, partly
because of a fashionable assumption that it is more enlightened and
scientific to talk about social hygiene and reformation."' 6 Noting that
it is seldom possible, "[w]hile a deterrent is in operation ...

to devise

a satisfactory way of finding out the number of occasions on which
it has been the decisive consideration in the mind of a person who
rejected an opportunity for law-breaking," 7 the author cautions that
we are seldom able "to compare a situation in which there is no
deterrent with a situation in which there is only that deterrent."' 8
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 48-49.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. (emphasis added.)
18. Id.
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For example, the abolition of capital or corporal punishment has almost
always meant replacement by lengthy prison commitments.
In view of the policy of the judges of Maryland's federal district
court, in the absence of strongly mitigating contrary reasons, of imposing prison sentences upon those convicted of income tax fraud as
a general deterrent to those taxpayers who might otherwise gamble
the financial reward to be gained from under-reporting against a fine,
but who will not gamble such a reward against the probability of a
prison sentence, the following passage is of interest:
The nearest approach to a sound and successful experiment
in testing a deterrent is probably that achieved by Professor
Richard Schwartz and Miss Sonya Orleans, with the help of the
United States Internal Revenue Service. Nearly 400 taxpayers
were divided into four matched groups. Members of the "sanction"
group were interviewed, and asked questions designed to remind
them indirectly of the penalties which they might suffer if they
tried to evade taxes. Members of the "conscience" group were
interviewed with questions designed to arouse their civic sense
and feelings of duty. The third, or "placebo" group were asked
only neutral questions, which avoided both sorts of stimulus. The
fourth group were not interviewed at all, in order to test the
possibility that even a "placebo" interview produced some effect
(which on the whole it did not seem to do). The interviews
took place in the month before the taxpayers were due to file
their returns for 1962. Without disclosing information about
individuals, the Internal Revenue Servce compared the returns of
the four groups for the year before the experiment and the year
1962. The reported gross incomes of both the "sanction" and the
"conscience" groups showed an increase, compared with small
decreases in the "placebo" and uninterviewed groups. In other
words, the attempts to stimulate both fear of penalties and civic
conscience seemed to have had effect. 5
5. See Schwartz and Orleans (1967). [The authors] drew a slightly bolder
conclusion:
that appeals to conscience were more effective than threat of sanctions;
but this inference assumes that the appeal and the threat were of equal
potency, whereas it is conceivable that unintentionally [the interviewers]
19
had made their "conscience" interview a more powerful stimulus.

Mr. Walker's apparent conclusion is a cautionary one - it is as
unjustifiable to assume that there is no type of crime against which
deterrents are effective as it is to assume the contrary.
Our awareness that we cannot determine with any degree of
accuracy the effectiveness of any particular technique as a general
deterrent becomes even more important in view of our increased under19. Id. at 59.
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standing that corrective or reformatory measures may hold considerably
less promise than was once hoped. Custodial sentences run into the
twin difficulties of (a) presenting "conditions so unlike those of real
life" that it is hard to tell "whether, and if so when, reformation has
been achieved" and of (b) bringing into it "unwanted by-products,"2
such as loss of job, separation from family and compelled association
with other offenders. Those arguments against custodial measures
are characterized by Mr. Walker as "hackneyed points . . . first made
in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries,"' not justifying the curtailment of the use of custodial measures but, rather, strongly indicating
the need for improvement within our confinement institutions. Still,
the author concludes that the main function of custody of adults as
opposed to juveniles should be to deter and to incapacitate. While
he suggests that the concept of "semi-detention" may water down the
negative features of incarceration, the author warns of its necessarily
limited scope. Semi-detention, such as by night or weekend, is suitable
for non-dangerous offenders who do not pose an appreciable escape
risk. It is characterized as providing an opportunity for the offender
to make restitution and to be placed under supervision without loss of
job or complete separation from family, with less contact with fellow
inmates, and with less difficulty in making the transition at the end
of confinement back to complete liberty.
Mr. Walker suggests strongly that financial penalties may pose
the best Sentencing alternative provided that the amount is determined
on the basis of preventing repetition of the offense rather than on
the degree of seriousness of the crime which has been committed, the
latter being a retributive aim. Stressing the need for sentences to be
selective, the author concludes, after studying mainly British data,
that "a fairly simple sentencing policy [should operate] on the following
lines":
If a man's circumstances make it reasonable to fine him, this is
the choice most likely to be successful. If a fine is ruled out by
his means, discharge him. Reserve prison for those whom you
feel you cannot deal with in either of these ways - for example,
because the offence itself was of the kind against which people
need protection. Use probation only where you have a strong
positive reason for doing so - for example, for a house-breaker
who cannot pay a fine. 2
The author admits that the affirmative results obtained by the
use of discharge, that is, no sentence, may well be due to the skill of
20. Id. at 76.
21. Id. at 76.
22. Id. at 94-95.
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the courts studied in selecting "good prospects," though he notes that
"[t]he selective explanation is not quite as plausible when it is applied
to the disappointing figures for probation."23 For example, figures in
one Scottish study showed higher rates of recidivism after use of
probation than after imposition of fine or discharge, and "for most
age-groups worse than the rates for imprisonment."'
Mr. Walker
also suggests that probation, like imprisonment, may be affirmatively
wrong and harmful for certain types of offenders.
Recognition of the fact that the foregoing techniques - discharge,
fine, probation and imprisonment cannot be said to be either
universally effective or ineffective necessitates an attempt to find an
effective process for determining the most appropriate approach in a
particular case. Mr. Walker advocates the use of what we know as
presentence reports, with the warning, however, that while they often
make it possible to predict more accurately whether the offender will
or will not again engage in crime, they do so "irrespective of the
sentence"2 5 and do not provide an accurate guide to the type or details
of sentence that would be most appropriate. What does often provide
such a guide is the response of an offender in the past to a penal
measure. For instance, did he stay out of trouble for longer after a
fine or probation or confinement than before? If so, perhaps the
sentencer should use the same sentencing technique again. If, on the
other hand, the offender has failed in the past to respond or immediately
got into trouble again, then another sentencing alternative should, at
the very least, be given consideration. The author suggests that often
"the prestige of psychiatry, which has to some extent been earned, to
some extent borrowed from the successes of physical medicine" has
brought into sentencing a certain overuse of the "process of diagnosis,
prescription and treatment," and "has become a model for penologists,
many of whom have a psychotherapeutic training or orientation."'
He accordingly warns clearly against over-reliance on the psychotherapeutic approach, noting that it has questionable utility in most
cases and that its prohibitive cost warrants its use in only very
select instances.
Mr. Walker's adherence to the reductivist aim in sentencing is
nowhere more apparent than in his statement that the "over-riding
question" for the sentencer is: " 'Which of the choices will result in
non-reconviction?' "27 This reviewer agrees that no type of sentence
is either "universally effective" or "universally ineffective"; that some
23. Id. at 95.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 102.
26. Id. at 103-04.
27. Id. at 105.
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offenders will be repeaters and will not respond to any sentence, and
others, perhaps fewer, will go straight regardless of what the court
does or does not do; that further historical research into what has
happened and is happening to individual offenders is needed; and that
for the present the sentencer must employ "strategic reasoning," that
is, he must make his choice rationally with a view toward "the greatest
probability of successful outcomes in a situation in which, because of
the intervention of chance or other [variable factors] or both, the
chooser cannot make certain of the outcome."2 Such a strategic
approach to sentencing, the author argues, is the only practical one and
is far more helpful than the currently popular "diagnostic" approach.
The need for flexibility in choice of type of sentence - for second
thoughts after a sentence has been pronounced and before it has been
completely served, so as to enable someone to alter a sentence which
is working out badly - for participation in sentencing by more than
a single sentencing judge - are variously discussed and emphasized.
Once again, there is an admirable lack of statements of conclusory
absolutes, though an exception in that connection is the view that
"sentences of a few months are not only an administrative nuisance
but often serve only to convince the offender that imprisonment is more
tolerable than he had thought; and in some cases even introduce him
to criminal associates for the first time."29 Perhaps that is true of the
offender who requires rehabilitation. But it may not be true of an
income tax defrauder, who is generally able, if he desires, to conform
his behavior to societal norms, and whose sentence is largely dictated
by considerations of general deterrence. The very thought of being
locked into a cell may strike sufficient fear into an about-to-be tax
evader to keep him in line. For him, reading about a three-month or
even a one-month sentence which has been meted out to another may
be all that is required.
The need to protect society against certain kinds of offenders is
stressed throughout the book, leading to the suggestion that, as a
means of prevention, some sentences should require custody for extended periods beyond what would otherwise be prescribed, provided
that any decision to impose a longer sentence is made rationally and
as freely as possible from retributive thinking. The question is thus
posed: "Why should we not use long sentences to prevent serious
harm which is the result of recklessness, negligence, incompetence or
even accident-proneness ?,,"0 The response given by Mr. Walker is that
"[h]istorically the answer lies in the emphasis which is placed on
28. Id. at 109.
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id. at 137.
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culpability: someone who did not intend to do what he did cannot be
blameworthy enough to justify long imprisonment." 31
In other words, the length of sentence is explicable only in terms
of retributive thinking. The need for further study of repetitive crime
and the nature of precautionary detention is apparent. The possible
need to shake out and identify the idea of blame and to confine those
who are dangerous to society, regardless of why they repetitively
commit, or can be expected to commit, offenses, crops up throughout
the book. At the very least, such an approach does highlight the need
in our federal system for insuring that, if a person is found not
guilty after trial by reason of insanity, that finding will be separately
entered and will subject the defendant to treatment and confinement or
to supervision until the threat posed by him to others has been brought
under control. The only excuse for letting such a person walk out of a
courthouse free is that he is blameless. And that excuse, and its
concomitant negative result, can only be justified by strict adherence
to the philosophy of retribution.
All through the book Mr. Walker, to use his own word in the
first sentence of chapter 11, "hinted" at the problem concerning the
advisability of controlling sentencers and the degree of such control.
All judges in this day and age are limited as to maximums with
regard to the periods of confinement and amounts of fines they can
specify. I know of no judge who would want it otherwise. On the
other hand, few judges favor mandatory minimum sentences. If there
is a need to guard against excessive judicial leniency, indeterminate
sentences up to a maximum would seem to provide a better answer.
Certainly, as Mr. Walker urges, prison or parole officials, who have
continuing contact with a sentenced offender and his ongoing problems,
should have a great deal of flexible and discretionary power to determine
how much, if any, of that part of a period of a sentence prescribed for
precautionary purposes should be served. As to probation, I would
agree that probation officers, who themselves must deal most intimately
with the probationer-offender, should have an important voice in determining whether an offender should be placed on probation. Whether,
however, one or more probation officers should have the power to veto
a judge's use of probation, as suggested by Mr. Walker, I find
more doubtful.
The author concludes that run-of-the-mill sentencing should be
left in the hands of judges, subject to certain controls, and that more
complicated sentencing functions should devolve upon a body of highly
selected and specially trained sentencers. I respectfully disagree. No
31. Id.
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judge I know enjoys his sentencing duties. But, to paraphrase Mr.
Walker in other contexts, I suggest that experience with sentencing
authorities in certain of our states and in other countries places the
burden of proof upon those who would take that function totally or
partially from judges. I buy completely the need for sentencing review,
though perhaps preferably by trial judges rather than by appellate
judges. I subscribe to the author's espousal of requiring sentencers
to state reasons for their sentences, either by saying the sentence is a
"normal one,"13 2- "[i]n which case . . . [the sentence reviewer] could
be asked . . . to declare that the sentence was not, or should not be,

normal, '3 3 "or to justify its abnormality."34 The Norwegian practice
in the latter regard is enlightening. The statement of reasons by
sentencers - the participation of more than one judge in finalization
of choice of sentence including semi-detention, work release and the
like - the granting of authority to prison and parole officials, with
or without the full approval of the sentencing judge, to vary the
sentence within a defined range, as experience with the individuallysentenced offender dictates - and the willingness of all exercising
sentencing authority, in each case, to move up and down and backwards
and forwards throughout the gamut of all available possibilities together could provide a more flexible approach to sentence pronouncement and administration than is followed today in most, if not
all, parts of the world. Perhaps, in the end, removal of all sentencing responsibilities from judges will be advisable. Perhaps, also,
as Mr. Walker suggests, some special types of offenders should be
referred to a sentencing authority, with all other sentences handled
by judges. For myself, I suggest that, as a starter, attention be
focused on trying to see how we can bring about improvements within
the framework of sentencing as it is currently being administered by
judges in most of the civilized world, before we largely or even in part
scrap that system and go to another.
Mr. Walker's book is packed full of provocative comments, probings and illustrations. Anyone participating in or particularly interested in sentencing will perforce find it not only very well worth
his while to read, but will gain ideas and insights from so doing. For
myself, as a sentencing judge, I found it fascinating, and will surely
return to a number of its pages as varied and varying sentencing
problems concern me in the future.
Frank A. Kaufman*
32. Id. at 158.
33. Id. n.8.
34. Id. at 158.
* Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maryland. A.B.,
1937, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1940, Harvard University.
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The Closed Enterprise System. By Mark J. Green, with Beverly C.
Moore, Jr. and Bruce Wasserstein. Grossman Publishers: 1972. Pp.
437. $8.95.
The Closed Enterprise System,' the latest of the Nader Study
Group reports, is a study of the failure of our antitrust laws and institutions to adequately safeguard and maintain an open economic
system. 2 Massively researched and generally well documented, full of
both scholarly references and invaluable data extracted from interviews
with numerous persons connected with enforcement of the antitrust
laws,3 the book is a compendium of case histories and proposals for
reform laced with scandal enough to satiate any palate. Because The
Closed EnterpriseSystem is an argumentative "report" or "brief," and
not a detailed legal and economic analysis of antitrust problems, it will
be of most interest and use to those venturing into the field for the
first time; however, it does contain a good deal of material that anyone
in the area will find interesting.

I.
The touchstone of The Closed Enterprise System is the maintenance of free and open competition. Operation of such a system is
the Study Group's Holy Grail and the starting point for its analysis;
there is no inquiry into the desirability vel non of competing economic
models. 4 The Study Group head describes the Group's "operating
premises" in this way:
1. The Closed Enterprise System is the first of two volumes by Ralph Nader's
Study Group on the nation's antitrust policies and problems. Scheduled for release
later this year is the second volume, a study of the Government acting as regulator.
2. At present, perhaps the main challenges to that system are posed by conglomerate mergers and "shared monopolies" (that is, an oligopolistic industry which
behaves more or less like a one-firm monopoly).
It should be noted that enforcement of the antitrust laws could by no means
be styled a complete failure. One recent success, for example, has been in the field
of horizontal mergers.
3. Of necessity, the book contains a number of anonymous quotations. The
number has, however, been kept surprisingly low.
The Study Group also sent questionnaires to the nation's 1000 largest industrial enterprises and to federal district judges. Responses were received from 110
of the former (eleven per cent) and forty-three of the latter (thirteen per cent).
4. See, e.g., J.
1967), contending:

GALBRAITH,

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL

STATE

206 (paperback ed.

The mature corporation has taken control of the market - not alone the price,
but also what is purchased - to serve not the goal of monopoly but the goals
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The maximization of consumer welfare was our talisman ....
Before all else, the economic system must deliver a diversity of
quality goods at low prices ....
Second, we opted for the private,
competitive economy . . . as the most efficient and equitable
mechanism to serve consumer welfare. . . . Third . . . it is anticompetitive structure more than conduct which cripples industrial
performance and which should be the emphasis of rational antitrust policy ....
And fourth, there was the suspicion of excessive
5
economic power, either public or private.
Although these premises represent a curious admixture of nineteenth
century Liberal and Populist thought with the latest in antitrust
theories,6 such a combination is appropriate, for the harm caused by
economic concentration (absent the adoption of an alternative legal
7
economic model) is great indeed. As we all learned in Economics 1,
monopolies and oligopolies can lead to overpricing, lower output and
inefficient resource allocation;8 inflation and underemployment;9 and
of its planning. Controlled prices are necessary for this planning. And the
planning, itself, is inherent in the industrial system. It follows that the antitrust
laws, in seeking to preserve the market, are an anachronism in the larger world
of industrial planning.
Proper analysis of such competing models would, of course, have made the book too
lengthy and complex for easy digestion. And, given the existing statutory pronouncements on antitrust, it is perfectly proper to focus on the manner in which those
laws are enforced. Still, it would seem that a study of the "closed enterprise system"
should devote some space to analyzing whether we do indeed want that system
"opened."
Interestingly, only ten per cent of business respondents to the Study Group
questionnaire believed "American industry would function better without any antitrust
laws." THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 473.
* 5. THE

CLOSED. ENTERPRISE SYSTEM

at xviii-xix.

6. One example is the attack on "shared monopolies." See, e.g., Posner,
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562
(1969); Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies.
82 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
7. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, chs. 25-26 (8th ed. 1970). But see B. BOCK
& J. FARKAS, CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY (1969). Cf. D. WATSON, PRICE
THEORY AND ITS USES, chs. 23-24 (2d ed. 1968).
8. These problems are perhaps more acute with oligopolies than monopolies,
for excess capacity is more often associated with the former. See, e.g., SAMUELSON,
supra note 7, at 493.
9. For a proposed solution to the inflation cycle focusing on structural causes
see Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1090
(1971).
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lack of product innovation ;1" furthermore, political and social pluralism
are apt to suffer as economic diversity decreases."
If evils of such magnitude result from failure to enforce the antitrust laws properly, why, then, has enforcement been so lax? The
most obvious reason is, of course, political pressure. 12 This can take
many forms: pressure on the Executive Branch to drop a case, pressure
on influential Congressmen to threaten loss of funds if an investigation
is not dropped and "Old Boy" network pressures stemming from close
ties between the agencies and the businesses they regulate. Yet, the
authors warn, political influence as an impediment to enforcement can
easily be overstated: "[i]nfluence peddling, corruption, and politicking
occur, often on important cases, but in sum they occur on only a
3
minority of cases."'

Other problems of antitrust enforcement are both more open and
more subtle. Problems such as lack of funds' 4 can, given the proper
political climate, be overcome. On the other hand, certain problems
inherent in the operation of any governmental bureaucracy are more
difficult to resolve. How, for instance, can a President who is genuinely
interested in antitrust enforcement be sure that his Antitrust Division
Chief, even though possessed of impeccable credentials, will behave as
vigorously as his past actions would indicate? Eminently qualified men
10. Although it is often asserted that a high level of innovation needs large size
and market power to sustain the necessary effort, empirical studies do not support
that assumption. See, e.g., Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and
the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 Am.EcoN. REv. 1097 (1965). See also Judge
Wyzanski's dictum in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954): "Industrial advance may
indeed be in inverse proportion to economic power; for creativity in business as in
other areas, is best nourished by multiple centers of activity, each following its
unique pattern and developing its own esprit de corps to respond to the challenge of
competition." 110 F. Supp. at 347.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427
(Ust Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J., for the court) : "It is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers.. . . to one in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few."
12. The book notes that "nearly all enforcement officials" discounted the impact
of politics on antitrust. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 31. Businessmen are
more realistic (or honest) - over seventy-five per cent of all business respondents
to the Study Group questionnaire thought "political considerations" played a factor
in governmental decisions to sue. Id. at 471.
13. Id. at 62.
14. For fiscal 1972, the proposed budget for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was $11,417,000. The Division at that time had 354 professionals
on its staff (316 attorneys and thirty-eight economists), an increase of only forty
over 1950. In fiscal 1971, the Federal Trade Commission's budget was $21 million.
The Study Group recommends a $100 million budget for the Antitrust Division.
THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 130.
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such as Lee Loevinger and Donald Turner, for instance, in the opinion
of the Study Group, failed to live up to advance expectations 5 . How
can a Congress concerned over industrial concentration insure that
expanded agency funding is not frittered away on trivial suits against
the makers of such products as kosher hot-dog rolls, or dispensers of
bull semen ?1" Or how can a Congress which has recognized a problem
and passed a statute to deal with it insure that the statute will be used?
Although Congress in 1950 amended section 7 of the Clayton Act
in an effort to stem the wave of mergers which had swept the nation
in the late 1940's, and despite the broad statutory language contained
in the new section 7, no suit was filed by the Antitrust Division under
the new act until 1955.
How can Congress and the Executive be sure that the courts will
take cognizance of antitrust needs? Here it is the behavior of lower
courts which has been most egregious. Section 3 of the Sherman Act,
for example, makes conspiring to monopolize a misdemeanor; section
5 of the Clayton Act permits such a criminal conviction to be introduced
in a later treble damage civil action as prima facie evidence of wrongdoing. Exposure to a possible jail sentence and severe civil damages
would seem, in theory at least, a good deterrent to antitrust violations.
Yet no businessman was sent to jail for price fixing until 1959. And
widespread judicial (and governmental) acceptance of nolo contendere
pleas in criminal cases undermines the possible deterrent effect of
section 5, since a nolo plea, unlike a criminal conviction, cannot be
used as prima facie evidence of wrongdoing in later civil actions. On
the other hand, when the courts do give the agencies new remedies or
new powers the agencies are often reluctant to make use of them.
In FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,' 7 for example, the Supreme Court, resolving a long-debated point, made clear that the FTC could petition
a court for a preliminary injunction to stop a proposed merger. Since
then, however, the FTC has made use of that power only once. 18
Moreover, even if a case has been litigated and even if a sweeping
victory has been won, there is no assurance that the Government will
not compromise the victory by entering into a consent decree with
the defendant. 19 Thus, after the Supreme Court held the merger be15. The blame in both cases, the book suggests, must be shared to some extent
with the Attorneys General, Robert Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach, respectively.
16. Trivial suits are, of course, one way to "do something" without running any
significant political risk.
17. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
18. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 357.
19. Nor is there any assurance that the courts will do their part to enforce
antitrust policy. See Cascade National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
386 U.S. 129 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court found the district court decree to
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tween Continental Can Company and Hazel-Atlas Glass Company
illegal in 1964,20 Continental was allowed to keep the two most profitable of Hazel-Atlas's eleven plants and eight of the nine other plants
were sold to Brockway Glass Company, making Brockway the second
largest producer of glass containers. In the words of the book, "the
divestiture sale itself constituted a clearly illegal horizontal merger."'"
Finally, and perhaps worst of all, even a stringent decree gives no assurance that the victory will be meaningful, for there is no systematic
review of the extent of compliance by the defendant with the decree. In
the early 1960's, the FTC reviewed fifty-six "carefully selected" consent
decrees for the Antitrust Division and found that "one-third of the
decrees were being either violated or evaded." 22 In response to the
Commission's recommendation that the Division bring contempt actions
or seek decree modifications against the violators/evaders, the Division
filed two new antitrust suits and just one contempt action. A sorry
record, indeed.
II.

What, then, can be done? The Closed Enterprise System suggests
a good number of changes which would aid in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws. To remedy certain defects in the arsenal of weapons
available to the Antitrust Division, for example, the Study Group
proposes that an Economic Information Center be established,2 3 and
that the Division be given the power -

now lacking -

to take oral

depositions of "potential" antitrust defendants prior to filing a case.
If the Government is provided with sufficient economic data it will be
much easier for the Division to determine which mergers, for instance,
should be attacked. More substantively, the book recommends that
the Division be notified of any merger in which one of the merging
parties has assets in excess of $5 million. The Division would then
have sixty days in which to decide whether to sue; if suit is not brought
within that time the merger can proceed. If the Division does decide to
be the "opposite" of what the Supreme Court had previously mandated [id. at 142] ;
the case was remanded with instructions "that there be divestiture without delay,"
and that a different court judge be assigned to the case. Id.
20. United States v. Continental Can. Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
21. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 185.
22. Id. at 180.
23. "All publicly and privately held corporations would report sales and profit
along divisional lines, as well as general data ranging from their investment accounts
to advertising expenditures, to one computerized central information-storage system
... . Quickly, and with far less expenditure of resources, the Antitrust Division
could tell what the market shares are, what an industry's concentration ratio is, what
the actual economic effect of past cases has been, and, partly as a result, could decide
what future cases should be filed." Id. at 135-36.
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sue, a restraining order, good for sixty days, will automatically issue.
At the end of the second sixty-day period there will be a preliminary
injunction hearing, after which the court can enjoin the merger pending trial if the Government has made a prima facie showing of the
illegality of the merger.24 Such a procedure would reduce the often
difficult problem - created by the inordinate length of antitrust litigation - included in divesting one company of another company with
which it has been working closely for a number of years. In addition,
the problem of measuring compliance with decrees imposed on defendants could be alleviated by inserting provisions in all decrees requiring regular submission by the defendant of detailed reports of its
activities to the Antitrust Division, enabling easy monitoring of the
extent of compliance by a court-appointed special master, whose fees
would be paid by the defendant.
To help make the treble damage civil action a more effective deterrent, the book recommends that a nolo contendere plea be admissible
at later civil trials as prima facie evidence of wrongdoing. It is also
suggested that, in order to enhance the effectiveness of consumer class
actions, bifurcated trials should be utilized: the first part of the trial
to determine the question - and extent - of the defendant's aggregate
liability to the class, and the second part to determine what portion
of the recovery should be given to each member of the plaintiff class.2 5
Such an approach simplifies the difficult problems of management presented when the class of plaintiffs is large and, to some extent, unknown - the typical consumer class action situation.
The most important suggestion, however, involves not new procedures or legislation, but education of the public with respect to the
common societal benefits that could be reaped from vigorous antitrust
enforcement. Consumer awareness of the evils of "closed enterprise"
behavior, coupled with communication of that awareness to elected
officials, is the best way to insure restoration of a system of free and
open competition. The Closed Enterprise System is a meaningful
contribution to that goal.
24. The idea is not entirely original. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLIcY 258 (1959).
25. The second of these suggestions has been approved by at least one court.
See In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in the Antibiotic Antitrust Actions
(Consumer Class Actions Opinion, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), mandamus
denied, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court stated:
[T]he question of liability is clearly predominant over the damage issue.
• * * It is far simpler to prove the amount of damage to the members of the
class by establishing their total damages than by collecting and aggregating
individual damage claims as a sum to be assessed against the defendants.
Id. at 281. For a criticism of that decision see Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 COLUmI. L. REV. 1, 34-42 (1972).
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III.
It should be noted that The Closed Enterprise System is not without faults. The style is often sarcastic and barbed to the point of being
distracting,2" and is, at times, apocalyptic. There are also some internal
contradictions. Thus, the 1968 Merger Guidelines promulgated by the
Justice Department are criticized:
The Guidelines hurt enforcement by telling savvy businessmen and
their lawyers how close they can get to the line of illegality; such
help will encourage brinksmanship, line-crossing, - and quibbling
over percentage points. .

.

. The Guidelines freeze antitrust law,

inhibiting flexibility as situations change.
On the other hand, the FTC is chastised for not using its guidelines
more." And in its zeal the Study Group has a tendency to over-read,
and over-rely on, particular scholarly works in support of a point,2 9
sometimes ignoring those which might challenge some of its conclusions.
Yet even with these faults, the book, by bringing together in one
volume a wealth of information for the general reader on the history
and procedure of our antitrust efforts along with an analysis of what
has gone wrong and suggestions on how the defects can be corrected,
is a useful book,"° hopefully, advancing in some small measure the
restoration of the free and open economy.
William L. Reynolds II*
26. For example, in referring to former Senator Eugene McCarthy's intervention
in a grand jury investigation of Minnesota banks the book makes a point of referring
to the Senator as "'Clean' Gene." THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 35.
27. Id. at 86-87.
28. Admittedly, the FTC guidelines lauded by the book were for a single
industry (cement), and promulgated after intensive research. Such industry guidelines,
however, would still "inhibit flexibility" and encourage "quibbling" and "brinksmanship."
29. Donald Turner is roasted, for example, for not proceeding against oligopolies ("shared monopolies") while in charge of the Antitrust Division, especially since
he had, in 1959, "recommended a major deconcentration effort." THE CLOSED
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 252, referring to C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
(1959). Yet the thrust of the 1959 Kaysen and Turner recommendation was for
legislative action against shared monopolies. Cf. Posner, supra note 6, at 1565-66
(1969). Turner did, however, within a year of leaving office, write an article which
concluded that shared monopolies could be attacked under existing legislation. Turner,
supra note 6, at 1216-17 (1969).
30. The legal profession, in particular, will find interesting the section on the
antitrust laws and the bar. THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM at 270-73. See also Comment, The Bar as Trade Association: Economics, Ethics, and the First Amendment, 5
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIas. L. REV. 334 (1970) ; Comment, The Wisconsin Minimum
Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wisc. L. REV. 1237. Cf. Note, A
Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARV. L. REV. 971
(1972).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B.,
1967, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1970, Harvard University.

